Introduction
The 1999 HOPE conference directed by Mary Morgan and Malcolm Rutherford changed how historians of economics, and historians of other social sciences, thought about the development of economics in the twentieth century. The various essays in their conference volume, From Interwar Pluralism to Postwar Neoclassicism (1999) , told a new story of the transformation of economics after World War II. The older view that it supplanted was that, in the American case, institutionalism had been the dominant professional practice, and that over the 1940s and 50s into the 1960s it was replaced by neoclassical economics. The various essays in the Morgan--Rutherford volume present a quite different picture, namely one in which a rich and varied set of conversations and approaches came to be replaced by a single mainstream with marginalized heterodox alternatives. The authors of the volume's papers located this transformation in the 1940s, specifically in the wartime connections among economists, statisticians, psychologists, engineers, mathematicians, and 1 I have refrained from using footnotes to ancillary arguments and indirectly related sources. The reader generally unfamiliar with the McCarthy years however will find an overwhelming array of materials to read and view as historians, psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and literary and cultural critics have all contributed to our understanding of that period. For a quick introduction, perhaps useful for a historian of economics, the books by Schrecker (1988 Schrecker ( , 1998 Schrecker ( , 2002 are required reading. Other useful works include Carleton (1985) , McCormick (1989) , Fones--Wolfe (1994) , Selcraig (1982) , Stewart (1950), and MacIver (1955) . For a cinematic slice of that history, see De Antonio and Talbot (1964) . In what follows I will argue that this particular claim 1) is generally accepted, but 2) is unsupported by good evidence, and 3) what evidence there is suggests that the claim is false.
Historiography of "McCarthyism and the Economics Community"
The That episode, because it was so egregious and involved so many individuals who became quite prominent in the economics profession, including of course, Nobel laureates Franco Modigliani and Leonid Hurwicz, has long held economists' attention. Recently Antonella Rancan (2008) , an Italian historian of economics, has re--examined this episode from the perspective of Modigliani.
A recent important paper (Giraud 2014) The Sweezy case at Harvard had occurred earlier but the McCarthy period was responsible for the disestablishment of labor union schools or worker schools with heterodox/radical/Marxist curricula.
This period thus saw the demise of a truly radical economics subdisciplinary community in the United States. Those persecutions were real and damaged the lives and careers of a number of individuals who were not in fact mainstream economists or connected to such economists. This is well documented and had a permanent effect upon radical politics in the United States effectively divorcing the pre--war radical movement from the radical heterodox movements that were to emerge in the 1960s.
Aside from these general histories, there are sets of institution--specific case studies, usually part of broader institutional histories, to draw upon. As an example of this genre, the volume "Economics and the World Around It" edited by Saul Hymans was the set of papers delivered at the (accessed August 25, 2015) . 5 His father had left Russia on the run from the Czarist Okhrana since he had helped the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet "seize the city of Odessa". He and his family were also good "friends with, and perhaps relatives of, the Bronsteins, whose best--known product was Leon Trotsky" (Bronfenbrenner 1988, 3) . 6 Other autobiographical accounts along these lines, by individuals loosely connected to economics, include game theorist Anatol Rapoport's Certainties and Doubts (2000) and RAND applied mathematician (creator of dynamic programming) Richard Bellman's (1984) America (1996) , all note on the effects of McCarthyism on economics in the 1950s.
In her pioneering study comparing development of the economics professions in the United States, England, and France, Marion Fourcade cited Goodwin's discussion (see below) concerning the relationship of the McCarthy era to changes in the way economics was done. She wrote (88--89):
The Cold War had begun, and public and private patrons were nervous about the ideological implications of the research they supported. In 1952 and 1954 two successive congressional committees launched investigations into the activities of the major foundations on the suspicion they helped spread radical ideas. Similarly the social sciences were first excluded from the National Science Foundation at its creation in 1950 on the grounds that their messy politics might 'compromise the perceived ethical neutrality and taken for granted disengagement of natural scientists (Gieryn, 1999, 97) '. This neoclassical economist had all the virtues many of his "plural" brethren lacked. Therefore, when hard--pressed administrators were faced with a choice between these two types of economists, can we doubt where their better judgment would have lead? …Assessing the effects of administrative repression on the professional behavior of scholars, Lazarsfeld and Thielens (1958, 257) My speculation is that they would have foresworn interwar pluralism for postwar neoclassicism (Goodwin 1999, 60--62 ).
Goodwin was a Vice President of the Ford Foundation in the 1960s and early 1970s, so his understanding of how such institutions "work" is both first--hand and as a scholar of the period. Although the overall picture has yet to be filled in, it is clear that economists had to be careful in expressing their views. Before further examining the "McCarthyism produced mathematization" story, we need to attend to another important context in which the claim has been made. We will then better understand the claim's curious role in historians' construction of their now "standard" narrative of the triumph of neoclassical economics in the Cold War and post Cold War period.
Critics of the New Mainstream Economics
The historical muddle that is associated with accounts of the development of economics in association with McCarthyism, the historiographical problems alluded to earlier, arise quite clearly in Whatever the wider doubts about the intellectual coherence of 'Marschak's market socialism,' the American military was one place where unquestioned adherence to the virtues of the market cohabited cheerfully/truthfully with the most vaunting ambitions of centralized command and control, without ever provoking any hand--wringing about conceptual consistency or soul--searching over freedom. Indeed, for researchers of a certain political stripe, the security clearance required for military consultants could be worn proudly as a badge of legitimation, serving to ward off a modicum of superficial distrust or the ubiquitous pall of McCarthyite suspicion (Mirowski 1999, 256 ).
Mirowski situated Cowles in a particular place, Illinois, at a time when anti--Communists were investigating not only the University of Chicago but also the University of Illinois (Selcraig 1982) . The prewar leftwing sympathies of many philosophers opposed to Hitler's totalitarianism supported their optimism that scientific planning, as they believed (we now know falsely) organized the Soviet Union's economy, was the best hope for a humane future. As Reisch shows, such views of science, and the philosophers who promulgated those views, were mostly silenced by McCarthyism. The subject matter of the philosophy of science was thus circumscribed to the fields of logic, metamatematics, and related formal studies in epistemology. The structure of science and scientific explanation, not science's larger use and impact, were to be its new subject matter. There is a second issue that sits uneasily alongside Streeten's primary argument. It is well to comment on it here for we will have to come back to it later. Streeten suggests that those who began to employ mathematical forms of argument in the late 1940s and 1950s were moral cowards. Nor can it usefully address the obvious question of why, after McCarthyism died, economists still failed to fight that good fight against capitalism. Streeten is presenting a moral claim: it is good and right to criticize capitalism. But since criticizing capitalism was in his view inconsistent with, or probably incoherent in, a mathematical argument, those who used mathematical and formal arguments were shunning an ethical duty. We should not therefore respect them or the work that they did. This may seem extreme but it is fully consistent with the coherence of the anti--mathematical vision of what used to be called the "Post Autistic Economics" community, now the "Real World Economics" community, a heterodoxy with its own journal that bestows moral superiority on anti--neoclassical economics. We will return to this point. evidence that scholars redirected the modes of inquiry that they had employed. We have not seen how McCarthyism and mathematization were in fact connected. We do though have a privileged window through which we can study these issues. The commissioned study was based on interviews with university teachers. Because of the authors' belief that university faculty members in the social sciences were most likely to have been affected because of their professional engagement with the kinds of social issues that concerned
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McCarthy and others, they created a sample of such faculty. The sample size was 2,451 social scientists at 165 colleges and universities. The interesting part of that study for our purposes is that the total sample included 565 economists, 23% of the total group interviewed. The sample was generated randomly and the individuals were selected randomly. For this reason it is useful to think of the overall results as pertaining to the economists. However, and this is the key point, the original questionnaires and their answers, the actual records, are preserved among the Paul Lazarsfeld papers at Columbia University's Butler Library. Examination of a sample of those questionnaires showed that although there were no identifiers of schools or individuals in the published work, the actual questionnaires contained exactly that information. In what follows I will describe the exact information available in a sampling from four boxes of questionnaires. Thirty--one economists do not a generalization make, but will give us some sense of the effect of the McCarthyism of the period on economists.
Some of the questions were designed to elicit views of social scientists on attitudes held about them by others. For example, "professors, at least social scientists, seem to consider themselves an occupational minority towards which significant sectors of the community hold relatively contemptuous attitudes." (14) Moreover, "Broadly speaking, from either the long--or short--range point of view, American social scientists felt in the Spring of 1955 that the intellectual and political freedom of the teaching community had been noticeably curtailed, or at least disturbingly threatened." (37) It is not necessary to go into much detail concerning the kinds of accusations that were made against faculty members. Being labelled a Communist was not unusual in that period: "Such cases suggest that in this period an individual can be called a Communist for almost any kind of behaviour, or for holding almost any kind of attitude. …In one case a faculty member was accused of being a Communist. The president of the school stated 'after all, he has been interested in interracial relations, which the communists are interested in.' He was dismissed." (56--57) The intellectual core of the study was set out in Chapter 3 of the book. From the preliminary interviews Lazarsfeld had supervised, he and his team created a list of about 20 relatively specific experiences. Questions were then worded so that the respondent would simply have to say whether or not these things had happened to him 11 . It was necessary to present a large number of situations related to academic life which might cause a teacher concern or induce him to act contrary to his convictions; depending on personality and background factors, one man's apprehensions might express itself in regard to his publications, while for another relations with students or with neighbors might be more indicative. (73) The chapter's title was "A Measure of Apprehension", and the results suggested that eleven of the items could be used to create an index of apprehension. These were further divided into two categories "One pertaining to feelings of worry about security, the other pertaining to precautionary behaviour." (74) Given our own concerns here, it is the second of these that will concern us. The results of the questionnaires are compelling: "We thus arrive at a rather far--reaching conclusion. There is indeed widespread apprehension among these social science teachers, but in generally it is hardly of a paralyzing nature; the heads of these men and women are 'bloody but unbowed '." (95) In other words these individuals were probably worried but appear to have taken few if any actions as a result of that worry. And there is no evidence brought forward to suggest that the kind of work they did was affected by those worries.
Taken together with those given earlier, these figures [based on the questionnaires] can indicate that the majority of teachers felt no curtailment of their own academic freedom or that of colleagues. But they also suggest consistently that a noticeable segment of our respondents and their colleagues felt intimidated by the difficult years -by fear of attack and harm to their careers that might result from a free expression of their views. (196) 11 There were virtually no women in the sample of economists. the constraints on their professional work appear to be minimal. Various respondents said that they did tone down writings on controversial issues, and one economist said he "had developed a simple formula for avoiding trouble: 'I just slant my writings to things that Congressman can't understand'."
(218--219) But that did not translate to larger sets of modifications of professional behaviour. There's no evidence in any of the questionnaires that any respondent changed the nature of his research.
While there is some evidence of some toning down of classroom material that might be offensive and draw charges of sympathy to communism, as professionals there seem to be no change in what they did.
The response to The Academic Mind was respectful and serious. It was reviewed in a very large number of journals and appears to have been discussed and evaluated at many sites. It is incontrovertible that the book mattered and helped shape what became a standard view over time, namely that university faculty had indeed felt intimidated and distressed during the McCarthy period, worried about their own security and status. This book then helped form the overarching narrative of the threatened nature of academic freedom during the McCarthy period and the way in which free inquiry was threatened by the paranoia of rabid anti--Communism. The book's specific conclusion that there was no significant evidence that academics changed the nature or direction of their academic work seems to have gotten lost.
There were only a few doubters or sceptics with respect to the book. Lionel Trilling writing in The Griffin in 1958 suggested "the professor lives characteristically by his acute awareness of the particular pathos of his situation. It is one of the fringe--benefits of his underpaid profession that he can suppose that he is among the insulted and injured, a marginal man, and therefore, according to the modern calculus of morality, a morally justified man" (4). Trilling went on to suggest that the status of the professoriate has changed in the postwar period and that the older view of the academic as lowly paid and of low status no longer characterized academic life. He regarded the reaction of the academic community as somewhat overdrawn though he agreed that the numerous episodes of harassment and firings were quite real. He remained unconvinced however that the spirit of the academic profession was crushed in that period. Reinforcing Trilling's belief, in a remarkable retrospective look at the volume, constructed for a law symposium on academic freedom, the book's co--editor Wagner Thielens stated that "First, in key ways, the academic profession was vulnerable all along to attack from the right. Second, during the late 1940s and early to mid--1950s, the attack came, and caused considerable damage.
Third, many signs in our data indicate that the damage was less than liberal authors like Mr.
Hutchins thought certain" (Thielens 1996 , 2).
Thielens went on to observe that academic social scientists were indeed more "left of center" than the American citizenry at large, and were thus, in their tolerance for non--traditional political ideas, more willing to accept a communist's beliefs as private and unassailable: "I believe that by taking such a stance, in an era when disagreement and disapproval could quickly turn into open charges, social scientists made themselves vulnerable "(op. cit., 3). The substance of the article supports Thielens' central point: the attacks were real, did some damage, but for the most part were resisted both on personal and institutional levels. It is in the "for the most part" that disagreements may arise. He mused "All together, in the two professional matters [of sanitized teaching and research], at least one conclusion seems fair: The situation was bad, but could have been much worse" (op. cit., 6). The remainder of his paper attempted to explain, using the survey data, "why the academic persona … worked in several ways to limit the success of the McCarthyite attacks" (op.
cit., 7).
No Ivory Tower (Schrecker 1986 ) had offered a different perspective. Framing matters in terms of the history of the responses of the academic community to the external threats represented by pressure from the business community, congressional committees, often by their own academic administrators, Schrecker went into sufficient detail to convince most all readers that something had indeed happened, and it was not pretty. Her case was convincing and appropriately intertwined with a history of progressive thought up through the McCarthy period. Academic freedom was never as secure as academics wished it to be, and the attacks on the academic community had gone on almost since the beginning of the academic community in the United In this selection of thirty--one economists there are expressions of concern about the general climate and the related belief that academic freedom is being somewhat harmed, but in no case was there any hint of change in research agenda, research techniques, research orientation, use of materials in research, and so on. People were doing whatever they had been doing and they continued to do it. Moreover, question #26 directly asked whether they knew of others who had had their research affected and no one knew anybody in that category. There is some level of apprehension but in terms of their job security and career prospects, it was extremely low. It's difficult to see where any conclusion could be drawn about economists changing the way they did economics to make it more technical or tool--based and thus unassailable by bigoted legislators, headline seeking congressional committees, union hating businessmen, conservative trustees and so on.
Surely though with the claims about how economics changed in the face of McCarthyism we would have expected to see some trace of an "escape to mathematization" in our excavation of the ruins. The evidence however fails to confirm any such thing. What then does that evidence tell us?
First, it tells us that historians' use of the phrase "economics community" during the Hussein's weapons of mass destruction that "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." Social scientists today are quite aware that journal editors do not welcome submissions in which the author attempts to establish a result and fails to do so. Unlike the natural sciences where a failure to confirm or to replicate is regarded as an interesting event, such is not the case in the social sciences. Thus too in the history of economics.
I've attempted to assess the claim that a major contributing element to the mathematization of economics in the post--war period was economists' defensive response to the era's McCarthyism. Safety it is said was to be found in formalization and quantification. This argument has been made on a number of occasions and seems to serve several different purposes.
In tracking down the evidence for this claim though, we found a circular set of references apparently based on a misunderstanding of the primary data source, the book The Academic Mind.
Pulling back the non--evidentiary curtain further we've learned that the reasons for making such a claim appear to vary from writer to writer. For several of the scholars writing on the subject, their larger point is the interweaving of two particular stories in the history of economics: First, there is the increased mathematization of economics going into and then throughout the post--war period and second, there is economists' responses to McCarthyism of the Cold War years. Scholars engaged with the second of these topics appear further to divide into two groups. The first is concerned with the destruction of radical and heterodox economics traditions as a result of the very real persecution of radical economists in the late 1940s through the 1950s. Frederic Lee has written most powerfully about these events and concluded that economists who were both radical and in the public eye were systematically removed from colleges and universities. Even more destructive of the labor--based radical community was that the radical, socialist, Marxist, and labor union schools which were long a part of the American urban scene were nearly all shut down. Those concerned with telling a complex and multi--layered story of the transformation of economics in the post--war period are generally more willing to provide nuanced accounts of both internal and external moves on the part of the economics community as it adjusted to, and sought accommodation with, the new world of larger universities, reasonable availability of public research funds, and an increased demand for the services of technically trained economists.
There is of course, behind all these stories, the larger effort of American political and . Now, as then, calls for a larger public service role for government, and greater attention to economic injustice, can lead to the public accusation that those economists are socialists attempting to subvert American values. Then, as now, a concern for addressing issues of inequality of wealth, of income, of education, can lead to the grave accusation of anti--Americanism. Obama is, or is he not, a socialist?
We have some sympathy for the argument that, in the post--war period, scholars in colleges and universities were becoming more not less important facilitators of achieving was termed "The American Dream". They taught the children of those Americans whose aspirations were that their children's' life experiences and economic successes would exceed their own. Economists played an important role in that period, providing a technical expertise to managers of the economy, and Not every contribution to the growth of scientific knowledge has a specific social cause.
Historians of science long ago gave up such a Marxist determinism as providing satisfying explanations for scientific discoveries and scientific change. That some uninteresting historians of economics continue to tell purely internalist stories of economic progress is no reason to tell uninteresting and unconvincing stories in which economic researchers have no agency. "McCarthyism made them do mathematics, teach it, and like it" hardly touches the larger set of personal beliefs, histories, and dreams that helped economists to shape a new professional identity in the postwar years.
